Monopoly with two types of consumers

Monopoly with two types of consumers

A monopolist sells a good to two types of consumers. Demand at price p \ge 0:

  • One high-value consumer: q_H(p) = \max\{20 - p,\ 0\}
  • Three identical low-value consumers, each with: q_L(p) = \max\{10 - p,\ 0\}

The monopolist has constant marginal cost c \ge 0 and no fixed cost.

In Parts 1–4 the monopolist must charge one price to everyone: it cannot tell the types apart, and resale is costless.

Part 1 (market demand).
(a) Derive the market demand Q(p) for all p \ge 0. Show that it is piecewise linear, and find the kink.
(b) Derive the inverse demand P(Q) for 0 \le Q \le 50. Sketch it.

Part 2 (marginal revenue).
(a) Derive MR(Q) on each segment.
(b) Show that MR is discontinuous at the kink. Does it jump up or down? Sketch MR on the same diagram as P(Q).

Part 3 (the monopoly outcome). Find the profit-maximising output, price, and profit when
(a) c = 4,
(b) c = 6.
In each case, check how many outputs satisfy MR = MC, and justify your final answer.

Part 4 (general cost). Let c \in [0, 20).
(a) For which values of c does the monopolist serve both types? For which does it serve only the high-value consumer?
(b) Show that as c rises past the threshold, the monopoly price and output jump. How large are the jumps?
(c) Can the profit-maximising output ever be exactly at the kink? Explain using your MR diagram.

Part 5 (third-degree price discrimination). Now suppose the monopolist can tell the two types apart (say, by an ID check) and resale is impossible. It may charge p_H to the high-value consumer and p_L to each low-value consumer.
(a) For c \in [0, 10), find p_H, p_L, the quantities sold to each type, and total profit. Why do we need c < 10?
(b) Let c = 4. Compare with your answer to Part 3(a): total output, consumer surplus of each type, profit, and total surplus (consumer surplus plus profit). Show that total output is unchanged but total surplus falls. Explain why the same output can produce less surplus.
(c) Let c = 6. Compare with your answer to Part 3(b). Show that discrimination is a Pareto improvement: no one is worse off, and someone is strictly better off.
(d) Generalise: show that the conclusion of (b) holds for every c \in [0, 5) and the conclusion of (c) for every c \in (5, 10). In one or two sentences, state what decides whether third-degree discrimination raises or lowers total surplus here.

Hint for Parts 3–4

When MR jumps up at a kink, the condition MR = MC can hold at two outputs, each a local maximum. Compute profit at both and compare.

Hint for Part 5(b)

Under a single price, every consumer who buys has marginal value equal to p. Under discrimination, compare the high-value consumer’s marginal value with a low-value consumer’s. What happens to total surplus if one unit moves from a low-value consumer to the high-value consumer?

Post your full working below, with the diagram if you can.